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The erosion of autonomy in online consumer
transactions
Eliza Mik
Singapore Management University, School of Law, Singapore
ABSTRACT
Online businesses inﬂuence consumer behaviour by means of a wide range of
technologies that determine what information is displayed as well as how and
when it is displayed. This creates an unprecedented power imbalance
between the transacting parties, raising questions not only about the
permissible levels of procedural exploitation in contract law, together with the
adequacy of existing consumer protections but also about the impact of
technology on consumer autonomy. There is, however, no single technology
that threatens the latter. It is the combined, mutually-enforcing effect of
multiple technologies that inﬂuence consumer choices at different stages in
the transacting process, creating an environment of ambient and pervasive
manipulation. It starts the moment consumers enter a search term
(autocomplete), proceeds through the display of search results (search engine
bias), the speed with which a website appears on the screen (trafﬁc
management) and concludes with the layout of elements on a website
(interface design), to name a few.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 30 November 2015; Accepted 21 December 2015
KEYWORDS e-commerce; consumer protection; technological nudges; behavioural advertising
If you can control where someone is going to look, you can control where they
are going to go.1
1. Introduction
Online commerce takes place in technology-mediated environments. The
online consumer depends on manipulated information that shapes his per-
ception of the marketplace and inﬂuences his purchasing decisions. The
online business designs the transacting environment to promote certain beha-
viours and to discourage others, to prioritise certain content while making
other content more difﬁcult to access or less prominent. Consumer attention,
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Eliza Mik elizamik@smu.edu.sg Singapore Management University, Level 4, Lee Kong
Chian School of Business, 17988 Singapore.
1Jesse Schell, Art of Game Design (CRC Press 2008).
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an increasingly scarce resource in itself, is directed towards speciﬁc products
or services, away from others.2 Prima facie, technology is used to ‘optimise
user experience’ or create a ‘friction-less transacting process’. It is rarely
recognised, however, that such optimisation is undertaken to beneﬁt the
business, not the consumer. Paradoxically then, the very environment that
was supposed to empower consumers with more choices, more information
and lower prices, seems to limit choices, restrict access to information and
to reduce consumer surplus.
Online businesses inﬂuence consumer behaviour by means of a wide range
of technologies that determine what information is displayed and how and
when it is displayed. This creates an unprecedented power imbalance
between the transacting parties, raising questions not only about the permiss-
ible levels of procedural exploitation in contract law, together with the ade-
quacy of existing consumer protections but also, on a broader level, about
the impact of technology on the autonomy of the consumer. Technology is,
after all, never neutral: depending on how it is used, it can preserve,
enhance or diminish autonomy. It enhances autonomy when it improves
the ability of making informed choices, of shaping and fulﬁlling individual
preferences. It diminishes autonomy when it interferes with or pre-empts
such choices and imposes preferences.
Legal literature expresses a recurring concern over technological domi-
nance of computers over humans, commonly associated with developments
in artiﬁcial intelligence. Such concerns are generally premature. The real
problem lies in the technological dominance of some humans over others,
or – in the context of online commerce – one transacting party over the
other. Such dominance derives from intelligence ampliﬁcation: the use of
technology to extend the information processing capabilities of humans.
The rising tide of technological innovation does not lift all boats but, in
many instances, increases inequalities and leverages the economic advantage
of some market participants.3 In the context of business-to-consumer online
commerce, technology augments the decision-making capabilities of
businesses and enables them to exert more inﬂuence over consumer choices
than in traditional transactional settings. Online consumers make decisions
in increasingly rich and complex information environments;4 their ability
to make choices (or: exercise their autonomy) is decreased not only by the
information overload and cognitive strain imposed by the online setting but
also by deliberate attempts by online businesses to manipulate such.5
2Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Harvard University Press 2015) 5; Consumer Insights, Microsoft
Canada (Spring 2015) established that the average attention span in 2013 is eight seconds.
3Frank Pasquale, ‘Technology, Competition and Values’ (2007) 8 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Tech-
nology. 607, 608.
4Louis Rosenfeld et al, Information Architecture (4th edn, O’Reilly 2015) 15.
5Carol Brennan and Martin Coppack, ‘Consumer Empowerment’ (2008) 32 International Journal of Consu-
mers Studies 306, 306.
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The problem must not be trivialised. As more commerce moves online,
consumer choices are not limited to books or gadgets but involve more
complex transactions like insurance plans and ﬁnancial products. Conse-
quently, the manipulation of choice by technological means exceeds tempor-
ary frustrations concerning overpayment for a book bought on Amazon. It
must also be emphasised that in most instances, the problem does not
concern the substance of a transaction but the very ability to choose the
transaction.
The following discussion aims to describe a problem that has been spora-
dically recognised by legal scholarship but which, judging by the pace of tech-
nological development, will increase in importance: the use of technology to
inﬂuence behaviour in a commercial context. The problem of technological
inﬂuence, or, technology-enabled transactional imbalances, has many mani-
festations, ranging from online price discrimination or behavioural advertis-
ing to less perceptible practices, such as search engine bias or adaptive web
design. It has, at least partially, been addressed in such areas as competition
law or data protection. In the context of commerce, however, it has attracted
only minimal attention.
The discussion commences with some observations concerning the con-
cepts of autonomy and technology. After presenting the current scholarship
on the importance of preserving choice, it sketches certain aspects and
examples of technological inﬂuence. The paper describes new forms of infor-
mation asymmetry, overt and covert forms of choice manipulation as well as
personalisation techniques. There is, admittedly, a substantial degree of
overlap between the foregoing examples, yet different aspects of one phenom-
enon can have different legal implications. Before discussing potential sol-
utions, it is attempted to pre-empt arguments that question the novelty of
the problem. As online businesses technologically steer consumers towards
transactions resulting in prima facie enforceable agreements, the accompany-
ing problems can be addressed from the perspective of contract law. Objec-
tively, the contract looks valid. Yet, the process leading to its conclusion
challenges most assumptions underpinning traditional contract formation.
This paper does not, however, analyse the validity of contracts formed
between online businesses and consumers, but seeks to establish reasons
not to enforce such contracts. Consequently, we are not looking for prerequi-
sites of autonomy or contractual liability, but for reasons to grant relief.6 After
exploring the contractual doctrines that could be used to provide protection
from technological manipulations of choice, the focus is shifted to regulatory
solutions. It is assumed that given the relative novelty and complexity of the
problem, no existing regulatory instrument is capable of providing adequate
6HLA Hart, ‘The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights’ (1948–1949) 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 171, 179.
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protections. Nonetheless, it seems worthwhile to explore one such instrument,
the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices, with its potential adaptation in
mind.
Two points before proceeding: ﬁrst, the word ‘erosion’ in the title seems
more appropriate (although less striking) than a technology-related term du
jour. ‘Erosion’ captures the gradual and subtle character of the technological
inﬂuences that shape online consumer behaviour. It also ﬁts in with the line of
scholarship that laments the degradation of consent in standardised, mass-
market transactions.7 While the latter concerns the ﬁctitious character of
‘agreement’ in light of the consumer’s inability to negotiate or even compre-
hend the terms of the transaction, the erosion of autonomy concerns the very
fact of entering such agreements. Second, the web, in its commercial appli-
cation, is an interconnected ecosystem of vendors, advertisers, content and
service providers as well as technical intermediaries. The predominant
business models rely on advertising, not on selling goods or services.
Money is made (directly or indirectly) not only when consumers purchase
books on Amazon or subscriptions to Spotify, but also when they click on
advertisements or otherwise interact with content.8 For the sake of brevity,
I refer to the commercial entities utilising technologies to inﬂuence consumer
behaviour as ‘online businesses’.
2. General observations: autonomy and technology
The present discussion does not concern criminal liability or moral culpability
but consumption decisions culminating in an obligation to pay. Hence, the
concept of autonomy need not be explored in its philosophical or physiologi-
cal origins. Similarly, we do not need to discuss broader aspects of the
relationship between humans and technology as our interest is limited to
the commercial uses of technology.
2.1. Autonomy
Autonomy is broadly associated with intention, consent and self-determi-
nation. As autonomy is difﬁcult to deﬁne, legal literature often describes its
prerequisites in negative terms as, for example, the ‘absence of external inﬂu-
ences in the context for action’9 or the absence of ‘limitations on
7Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate, The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton University
Press 2013).
8For a succinct description of the online advertising ecosystem see Richard Warner and Robert H Sloan,
‘Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to Informational Norms’ (2012) 15 Vanderbilt Journal
Entertainment & Technology Law 49, 57–60.
9Roger Brownsword, ‘Agents in Autonomic Computing Environments’ in M Hildebrandt and A Rouvroy
(eds), Law, Human Agency and Autonomic Computing: The Philosophy of Law meets the Philosophy of
Technology (Routledge 2011) 68, 69.
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informational self-determination’.10 In particular, autonomy is frequently
equated with the ability to make choices11 and further one’s interests.12 The
close connection between choice and autonomy is also recognised in compu-
ter science.13 Logically, irrespective of whether we adopt a philosophical or
practical approach and whether we recognise the inherent value of choice,
we must assume that any manipulation or reduction of choice negatively
affects individual autonomy.14 As it is assumed that the ability to make
choices requires an awareness of the available options,15 autonomy is affected
not just by a direct manipulation of the act of choosing but also by a manipu-
lation of the context in which choices are made.
Additional controversies concern the very ‘possibility’ of autonomy.
Although autonomy is not synonymous with free will, the two concepts are
interrelated and often interchangeably described as prerequisites of liability.
It has become fashionable to observe that the existence of free will (and
thus autonomy) appears questionable in light of recent scientiﬁc ﬁndings.16
Seemingly, we are less in control of our actions and decisions than it is com-
monly believed. A total denial of free will on the basis that neither our motives
nor our decisions are the product of rational thinking and clear mental pro-
cesses is, needless to say, impractical.17 Theories emphasising that human
decisions are the result of deterministic forces of neurological origin not
only fail to distinguish between actions (such as raising one’s hand) and
decisions (such as buying insurance) but also between ‘legal’ and ‘psychologi-
cal’ free will.18 More importantly, Farahany observes the frequent conﬂation
of dispositions, which may be the underlying causes of decisions, with control
over such decisions. An addictive personality predisposes to compulsive shop-
ping. That compulsion is, however, distinct from the act of shopping. An
absence of control over dispositions does not translate into an absence of
10P Schwartz, ‘Internet Privacy and the State’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Review 815, 823.
11MJ Radin, ‘Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment’ (2000) 75 Indiana Law Journal 1125.
12Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law Review 995, 1034.
13Batya Friedman and Helen Niessenbaum, ‘Software Agents and User Autonomy’ AGENTS ’97 Proceedings
of the First International Conference on Autonomous Agents, 466, www.vsdesign.org/publications/pdf/
friedman97softwareagents.pdf (accessed 30 November, 2015).
14TM Scanlon, ‘Promises and Contracts’ in Peter Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2001) 112–14.
15Yochai Benkler, ‘Of Sirens and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information and Law’ (2001) 23 New York Uni-
versity Law Review 76, 110.
16K Burns and A Bechara ‘Decision-making and Free Will: A Neuroscience Perspective’ (2007) 25(2) Behav-
ioral Sciences and the Law 26; B Libet ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in
Voluntary Action’ (1985) 8(4) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 529.
17Jos de Mul and Bibi van den Berg, ‘Remote Control, Human Autonomy In The Age Of Computer-
Mediated Agency’ in Hildebrandt and Rouvroy (n 9) 51, 52.
18Contrary to the claim implicit from Libet’s study that an initial event potential signaled by neural activity
predetermines subsequent actions, it appears that when choices are made, alternative possibilities for
action are kept open, see Stephen M Fleming et al, ‘When the Brain Changes Its Mind: Flexibility of
Action Selection in Instructed and Free Choices’ (2009) 19 Cerebral Cortex 2352, 2353.
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control over actions.19 Although our choices may derive from inﬂuences that
we are neither aware nor in control of, we cannot assume that the average
person has no control at all.20 Such a view would annihilate the very possi-
bility of legal liability.
It is important to distinguish between different types of internal inﬂuences,
or predispositions, while at the same time acknowledging the presence of
external inﬂuences that affect choices. As a total absence of external inﬂuences
is impossible, as sterile and isolated transacting environments do not exist, the
challenge lies in establishing what types or degrees of external inﬂuences are
unacceptable due to the degree with which they affect decisions.21 In other
words, acknowledging the difﬁculty of establishing the internal origins of a
decision, the focus must be placed on those inﬂuences, which are capable of
objective observation. We may not have full autonomy in the neurological
or psychological sense, but whatever autonomy we have should not be
further limited by external factors without our awareness. Baldwin emphasises
that the question is not whether the decision is inﬂuenced but whether the
context in which it is made is manageable.22 The decision-making environ-
ment may not be devoid of external inﬂuences but when the consumer is
capable of recognising and neutralising such, his autonomy is preserved.
The problem lies in identifying those inﬂuences that cannot be managed
and therefore affect autonomy to an unacceptable degree. Irrespective of
the foregoing, it must be emphasised that even if humans have sufﬁcient
autonomy to be held liable for their choices, we cannot assume that they
will make rational choices.23
2.2. Technology
There is no single technology that threatens the autonomy of the online con-
sumer. It is the combined, mutually-enforcing effect of multiple technologies
that inﬂuence consumer decisions at different stages in his path-to-purchase,
creating an environment of ambient and pervasive manipulation.24 In effect,
consumers can be ‘steered’ towards speciﬁc websites and/or speciﬁc products
on websites. Although it cannot be claimed that consumers are
19Nita A Farahany, ‘A Neurological Foundation For Freedom’ (2011) 11 Stanford Technology Law Review 1,
29–30.
20Jos de Mul and Bibi van den Berg (n 17) 52.
21See, A Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton University Press 1996) 64–65, who distinguishes between
internal and external autonomy, the former being associated with maturity and competence, the
latter with absence of means, information or presence of inﬂuences.
22R Baldwin, ‘From Regulation to Behavior Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree’ (2014) 77 (6) Modern
Law Review 831, 849.
23Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions (Harper Collins 2008).
24Peter-Paul Verbeek, ‘Ambient Intelligence and Persuasive Technology: The Blurring Boundaries Between
Human and Technology’ (2009) 3 Nanoethics 231; Susan W Brenner, ‘Law In An Era Of Pervasive Tech-
nology’ (2006) 15 Widener Law Journal 667, 670.
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technologically coerced or pressured into transactions, it can be claimed that
online consumers (a) encounter an increased difﬁculty to exercise choice or
become aware of the range of available choices and (b) are exposed to
novel forms of exploitation.
The technologies that inﬂuence online choices can be broadly divided into
those relating to the selection of information and those relating to its presen-
tation. In both instances, online businesses beneﬁt from developments in
machine learning and processing power to collect and analyse data pertaining
to consumer behaviour. Their decisions as to what content to display to a con-
sumer are best described as data-driven, as they rely on statistical, empirically
tested information from millions of prior interactions. As businesses commu-
nicate with consumers through the graphical user interfaces of websites, most
inﬂuences occur at the level of website design. One speciﬁc area, Human
Computer Interaction or ‘HCI’, focuses on designing interactions between
humans and computer systems to facilitate speciﬁc outcomes. As computer
interfaces constitute artiﬁcial environments that lack traditional physical
clues (such as buttons or door knobs), HCI aims to balance usability and
functionality with the constraints introduced by limited screen space and
the two-dimensional character of the online environment. The line between
functionality and usability on one hand and inﬂuence on the other may
become blurred when websites are engineered to promote or increase the like-
lihood of certain actions. It must be acknowledged that interface design in
itself may facilitate certain choices and discourage others, irrespective of
and in addition to the fact that choices are generally determined by what is
presented.25
The degree to which consumer behaviour can be inﬂuenced by means of
colours, shapes and general layout26 is difﬁcult to appreciate. Such appreci-
ation can only be gained from the realisation that detailed design decisions
relating to discrete elements of a website are frequently based on empirical
ﬁndings from lab experiments involving fMRI, eyeball tracking and heat
maps. The effectiveness of alternative versions of a webpage is measured in
real-time on actual users until the most effective (in terms of eg conversions)
version is found.27 As indicated in the opening quote, the ability to guide one’s
attention towards particular elements often translates into the ability to direct
the next action. In sum, as it has become possible to observe and analyse not
only behaviour but also, to a large extent, the actual decision-making process
preceding such behaviour at a neurological level, technological inﬂuences are
not based on intuitive speculations but on actual empirical ﬁndings.
25Julie Jacko, The Human-Computer Interaction Handbook (3rd edn, 2012 CRC Press) 78–83.
26Natalie Nahai, Webs of Inﬂuence (Pearson 2012) 72.
27Stephen Wendel, Designing for Behavior Change (O’Reilly 2014) 256.
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The resulting dangers are expressly recognised in competition law, with
regulators paying increasing attention to the manner in which companies
like Google present (speak: promote) their own content alongside that of
their competitors.28 From the perspective of the online consumer, however,
the inﬂuence of technology is difﬁcult to appreciate. Technological interven-
tions often remain hidden or difﬁcult to detect as they are designed to be
transparent in the computing sense: functioning without those affected being
aware of their operation. Transparency increases potency: it is easier to inﬂu-
ence people if they are not aware of being inﬂuenced. An awareness of inﬂu-
ence generally translates into an ability to ignore or to counteract. As indicated
by Baldwin, external inﬂuences are objectionable if they cannot be managed.
Logically, such is the case with inﬂuences that are not perceived. To compli-
cate matters, the actual technological capacity of online businesses to inﬂu-
ence consumer choices is difﬁcult to estimate as most research into
consumer behaviour is proprietary. In fact, some technologies have reached
a level of sophistication that has necessitated measures to hide their effective-
ness for fear of public backlash.29 The general public gains infrequent insights
into the technological abilities of online companies when, for example, it is
revealed that Facebook experimented on its unwitting users to establish the
extent to which their mood can be affected by the selective display of negative
messages30 or that Google tested 40 shades of blue to increase the likelihood of
link activation.31 It is therefore important to distinguish between what we
know – or assume – to be possible from what can be actually possible.
2.3. Autonomy and technology
The relationship between autonomy and technology formed an integral part
of the scholarship that developed around so-called ‘electronic agents’, ie soph-
isticated computer systems or programs operating without human supervi-
sion. It was argued that once an electronic agent attained a high level of
complexity, often associated with artiﬁcial intelligence,32 it would become
autonomous. Autonomy derived from technological sophistication and the
accompanying ability to make one’s own decisions. The main concern was
that autonomous agents would produce output that was not only
28See European Commission Statement of Objections on comparison shopping service, 15 April 2015,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4781_en.htm (accessed 30 November, 2015).
29Samual Greengard, ‘Advertising Gets Personal’ (2012) 55 Communications of the ACM 8, 18.
30Adam D.I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillroy, Jeffrey T. Hancock, ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive Scale
Emotional Contagion through Social Networks’, (2014) 111 (24) Proceedings of the National Academy
of Science of the United States of America 8788.
31Alex Hern, ‘Why Google has 200m reasons to put engineers over designers,’ The Guardian, 5 February,
2014, www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/05/why-google-engineers-designers
32SJ Russell and P Norvig, Artiﬁcial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Prentice Hall 1995) 31; for current state
of development see, Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence, Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press
2014) 19.
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unforeseeable or commercially undesirable for their operators, but potentially
harmful for others. The resulting inquiry sought to establish at what level of
autonomy law should (a) absolve operators from liability for the agent’s
actions and (b) recognise the independent personhood of electronic
agents.33 Logically, if operators were to be relieved from liability, electronic
agents needed legal capacity.
Although the debate relied on a more mechanistic understanding of auton-
omy, some of its aspects remain relevant. The ‘electronic agent’ scholarship
associated autonomy with the ability to make decisions and emphasised the
relationship between autonomy and liability: if a computer is autonomous it
should be liable for its actions. The debate focused on protecting persons
deploying the technology, its operators.34 More recently, academic concern
has shifted from the protection from unplanned output to the express recog-
nition that technologymay negatively inﬂuence the autonomy of its operator.35
If a computer reduces the autonomy of its operator, such reduction should also
affect his liability. If we map the ‘electronic agent’ debate onto online com-
merce, it becomes apparent that the concept of ‘operator’ only ﬁts one transact-
ing party: the online business. It is the latter who designs, deploys and controls
the operation of the ‘agent’. It is important to recognise that technology may
affect the autonomy of those who deploy it and, more importantly, those
who interactwith it. The online consumer falls into the latter category: although
he uses the technology, he does not operate or control it. It is his autonomy that
requires protection, not that of the online business.
3. The preservation of choice
To date, the use of technology to inﬂuence behaviour has been discussed
under the label of ‘normative technologies’, ie technologies used with norma-
tive intent to affect or control behaviour.36 Popular examples are speed
bumps, which prevent drivers from exceeding the legally prescribed speed
limits without damaging their cars, automatic gates limiting entry to public
transportation systems to those in possession of tickets and digital rights man-
agement technologies, which preclude the unauthorised reproduction of pro-
tected content. Normative technologies are predominantly addressed in the
area of public regulation, particularly criminal law and public safety. Although
different technologies vary in their effectiveness, scholarship unequivocally
acknowledges their ability to inﬂuence behaviour and affect choices.
33LE Wein, ‘The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Towards and Automation Jurisprudence’ (1992) 6
Harvard Journal Law & Technology 103; T Allen and R Widdison, ‘Can Computers Make Contracts?’
(1996) 9 Harvard Journal Law & Technology 25.
34LE Wein (n 33) 106, 107; Allen and Widdison (n 33) 36.
35Brownsword, ‘Agents’ (n 9) 68.
36Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press 2013) 11.
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The use of normative technologies is generally regarded as acceptable if (a)
they are deployed by a public actor and/or (b) they enforce (or implement) an
existing, democratically sanctioned norm. Interestingly, even when normative
technologies are deployed to monitor compliance with or to enforce laws
advancing social welfare, concerns are expressed with regard to the degree
of choice left to human actors. If a particular technology prevents or signiﬁ-
cantly limits the possibility of engaging in a certain behaviour, then there is no
choice but to follow the law.
To clarify: the problem does not lie in the quality of the underlying norm
but in the lack of choice whether to comply. There is a marked difference
between prohibiting something and making something impossible (or very
difﬁcult) to do.37 The question is always one of degree: the height of a
barrier translates into the difﬁculty of unauthorised entry, the strength of
an encryption algorithm translates into the difﬁculty of circumventing tech-
nological copyright protection. Irrespective of the context and the purpose
of the technological limitation, whenever choice is restricted, concerns are
expressed about ‘the authenticity of moral decision-making’ and the ‘corros-
ive effect on constitutional values of accountability, transparency and partici-
pation’.38 Even in socially beneﬁcial and legally sanctioned contexts and even
if a technology is deployed by a public actor, limitations of choice are per-
ceived as undesirable or outright impermissible.39
The importance of preserving choice is also recognised in the areas of
behavioural economics and regulatory theory. It is recognised that the
manner of presenting choices (‘choice architecture’) affects what is
chosen.40 Decisions can be inﬂuenced by manipulating the order of available
alternatives, their attributes and the selection of defaults, amongst others.41
Thaler and Sunstein call this activity ‘nudging’ and deﬁne a nudge as any
aspect of design ‘that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without for-
bidding any options or signiﬁcantly changing their economic incentives’.42
The theory behind nudges, libertarian paternalism, relies on ﬁndings in
behavioural science and cognitive psychology and emphasises that many indi-
viduals make inferior decisions concerning their own welfare—decisions that
would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities
and strong willpower.43 Consequently, as too many choices decrease decision-
37Roger Brownsword, ‘In the Year 2061: From Law to Technological Management’ (2015) 7(1) Law, Inno-
vation & Technology 1.
38Brownsword, Rights, Regulation (n 36) 116.
39ibid.
40R Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth And Happiness (Yale University
Press 2008).
41Eric J Johnson et al, ‘Beyond Nudges: Tools of Choice Architecture’ (2012) 23 Mark Lett 487, 488.
42Thaler and Sunstein (n 40) 6.
43C Sunstein and R Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law
Review 1159, 1167.
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making capacity and increase transaction costs, regulators, who are regarded
as choice architects, are not only permitted but required to create decision
environments that promote speciﬁc choices. Although Thaler and Sunstein
insist that nudges must preserve choice, it is acknowledged that some
nudges are not designed to promote informed and rational decision-
making, but to exploit behavioural biases on a subconscious level.44 In par-
ticular, Baldwin distinguishes between nudges depending on their degree of
inﬂuence and expressly recognises that nudges can shape preferences to the
point of preventing individuals from determining their true preferences and
obstruct informed decision-making.45 Providing information to enable
rational choices differs from presenting information in a manner that
encourages a speciﬁc choice on a subconscious level. While the promotion
of socially desirable choices (eg increased savings, organ donations) by
means of nudges constitutes a common regulatory strategy,46 it remains con-
troversial whether regulators should be allowed to take advantage of cognitive
biases. Even if such ‘cognitive exploitations’ aim to beneﬁt the regulatee, they
limit autonomy by promoting choices that may not be consistent with his
preferences.
The limitation of choice and the accompanying threat to autonomy
assumes a different dimension when ‘technological nudges’ are deployed by
commercial actors, ie when choice architects no longer act for the beneﬁt of
the person being inﬂuenced, but exclusively for their own. It is often not
appreciated that technology can be used not only to enforce legal norms,47
but also for private, commercial purposes.48 We can no longer speak of
public welfare or rely on legislative supervision. When online businesses
use technologies to inﬂuence consumer choices, our concern is not the ‘mor-
ality of decisions’ or the ‘limits of legal paternalism’ but the legally permissible
levels of transactional exploitation.
The problem is not, however, limited to the type of actor and the shift from
the public to the private, proﬁt-oriented sphere. Normative technologies and
nudges are predominantly discussed in the context of physical environments.
The tenor of the debate surrounding the preservation of choice changes once
technological inﬂuences occur in an online environment. The threat to auton-
omy increases once we move from a setting where some elements can be
44See generally Evan Selinger and Kyle Whyte, ‘Is there a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and Ethics of
Choice Architecture’ (2011) 5(10) Sociology Compass 923.
45Baldwin (n 22), 835, 836; see also P Guldborg Hansen and A Jespersen, ‘Nudge and the Manipulation of
Choice’ (2013) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 3.
46The Behavioural Insights Team EAST, Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights, who focus on ways
of steering the behaviour of regulates, 50.
47Lawrence Lessig ‘The Zones of Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Standford Law Review 1403, 1408.
48Colin Scott, ‘Regulatory Innovation and the Online Consumer’ (2004) 26 Law and Policy 453; see also Bibi
van den Berg and Ronald E Leenes, ‘Abort, Retry, Fail: Scoping Techno-Regulation and Other Techno-
Effects’ (2013) 25 IUS Gentium 67, 69, 75.
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 11
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
5 0
5 M
ay
 20
16
 
designed to inﬂuence behaviour to a setting where most elements can be
designed to exert such inﬂuence. Lessig famously stated that, online, behav-
iour is predominantly structured by code and that code is more effective in
regulating behaviour than law or physical architectures.49 The abstract
notion of ‘code regulates’ ﬁnds its practical embodiment in the manner in
which online businesses code and thus control the entire interaction. The
code underlying websites deﬁnes what can or cannot be done, it predeter-
mines the range of possible actions.50 Online consumers become ‘pathetic
dots’ who unwittingly enter an environment that makes them more regulable
and susceptible to ‘technological management’.51
Most commercial websites can be seen as choice architectures designed to
exploit every known cognitive bias of consumers. Online businesses can
promote certain actions (speak: transactions) by making them easier and
design entire navigation patters to guide consumers towards certain out-
comes.52 In the words of one author: when we go online, we are following
‘scripts written by others’.53
It is, of course, acknowledged that all commerce takes place in artiﬁcial
environments. Leaving aside barter exchanges in early hunter-gatherer
societies, there is always a physical, man-made architecture creating the trans-
actional settings. Seemingly, the fact that the online environment is made of
code does not add anything new. After all, both websites and department
stores are artiﬁcial constructs designed to inﬂuence purchasing behaviour
for the proﬁt of its owners. The difference lies in the sheer range and
potency of various technological tools at the disposal of online businesses.
The technologies constituting the online setting create new possibilities, or
‘affordances’, to inﬂuence behaviour.54
4. A new type of information asymmetry
Online commerce has been popularly associated with consumer empower-
ment deriving from increased access to market information and increased
retail options.55 While it cannot be denied that online consumers have
access to more information than their ofﬂine counterparts, the availability
of information does not translate into the ability to process it. Consequently,
access to more information need not result in improved decision-making and
49Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books 2006).
50Dan Saffer, Microinteractions (O’Reilly 2013) 69.
51Brownsword, Rights, Regulation (n 36) 15, 26.
52Stephen Wendel, Designing for Behavior Change (O’Reilly 2014) 126, 127.
53Nicholas Carr, The Shallows (Atlantic Books 2010).
54Dan Lockton, ‘Persuasive Technology and Digital Design for Behavior Change’, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125957 (accessed November 30, 2015).
55Lauren L Labreque and others, ‘Consumer Power: Evolution in the Digital Age’ (2013) 27 Journal of Inter-
active Marketing 257.
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better choices.56 What is more important in the present context is that online
consumers themselves constitute a source of information.
This phenomenon, this problem, is predominantly discussed in the context
of privacy protection. The focus is traditionally placed on the ethical aspects of
collecting personal information, the concern being the invasion of privacy,
less so the actual subsequent commercial utilisation of such information
and the potential loss of autonomy. Privacy concerns aside, it must be recog-
nised that the information generated by consumers during their online activi-
ties places businesses in a position of unprecedented transactional advantage
deriving from a new type of ‘information asymmetry’. Traditionally, the term
denotes a situation where the vendor knows more about a product than the
buyer. In online transactions, it denotes a situation where the vendor also
knows more about the buyer then the buyer himself. Such information may
include not only basic items as name, age and gender but also past and
current online behaviour, including consumption habits, social connections
etc. Technology enables online businesses to construct detailed models of
each consumer, not just on the basis of information derived from their own
websites but also from the customer’s general online activities, including his
non-commercial, hedonic or professional use of the Internet. Consumer pro-
ﬁles are compiled from multiple data sources to create a database of ‘inten-
tions, desires and preferences’.57 While the online business knows (almost)
everything about the consumer, the consumer has very limited information
about the business. For the consumer, the other party is a black box. In
most instances, such asymmetry creates a unique transactional advantage
for the online business and affects the customer’s ability to pursue her own
self-interest.58 The business’ information superiority translates into the
capacity to inﬂuence the customer and to direct his actions towards outcomes
beneﬁcial to the business.59 According to Calo,
the consumer is shedding formation that, without her knowledge or against her
wishes, will be used to charge her as much as possible, to sell her a product or
service she does not need or needs less of, or to convince her in a way that she
would ﬁnd objectionable were she aware of the practice.60
What is more disconcerting, however, is that personal information is lever-
aged not only to detect consumption preferences but also certain states, of
56Paul Burrows, ‘Contract Discipline: In Search of Principles in the Control of Contracting Power’ (1995) 2
European Journal Law & Economics 127, 137, 138.
57Ira S Rubinstein and others, ‘Data Mining and Internet Proﬁling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological
Approaches’ (2008) 75 University of Chicago Law Review 261, 272.
58Calo (n 12) 999; Neil M Richards and Jonathan H King, ‘Three Paradoxes of Big Data’ (2013) 66 Stanford
Law Review Online 41, 42–43; Dirk Van den Poel and Wouter Buckinx, ‘Predicting Online-purchasing
Behavior’ (2005) 166 European Journal of Operational Research 557.
59Neil M Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934, 1955; Jarron Lanier,
Who Owns the Future? (Penguin 2013) 56.
60Calo (n 12) 1029.
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both permanent and temporary nature. Some of those states resemble the
aforementioned ‘dispositions’, such as depression-prone and addictive per-
sonalities. Logically, online businesses are not responsible for their existence.
The consumer’s physiological or psychological state is attributable to occur-
rences in his life, such as divorces, promotions, deaths in the family, etc.
His dispositions may be hereditary. Businesses are capable of discovering
these states or dispositions and turning them into bargaining advantages. I
deliberately refer to the states of the consumer as ‘vulnerabilities’ as they
are used to his disadvantage. Were it not for technology, they would have
remained undetected and ‘transactionally neutral’.
Ofﬂine, the consumer’s state would have been observable only in the most
obvious instances (extreme grief, advanced pregnancy) or by the most percep-
tive of sales persons. In a traditional setting, an intimate knowledge of a con-
sumer including his vulnerabilities derives from a longstanding relationship
that the business may be reluctant to abuse. In an online setting, such knowl-
edge is based exclusively on access to large amounts of consumer data and
pure computing power.
Themere knowledge of vulnerability, just like themere presence of a bargain-
ing advantage, is not legally reprehensible. Arguably, neither is its detection
(leaving aside privacy concerns).What is objectionable, however, is its commer-
cial exploitation.61 It seems inherently unfair to take advantage of the fact that
somebody is grief-stricken ormore likely to succumb to ‘special offers’due to his
addictive personality. Arguably, in the context of criminal liability, some of
those states could result in temporary incapacity. In a purely commercial
context, however, such ‘incapacities’wouldbe too subtle to affect the consumer’s
liability despite the fact that at the moment of transacting the consumer’s
decision-making ability was compromised and taken advantage of. To re-
emphasise: the online business does not create states or dispositions but exploits
their accompanying decreases in rational decision-making. Technologies lever-
aging personal information largely obliterate the distinction between ordinary
and vulnerable consumers.62 All online consumers are potentially vulnerable,
each in its own way. It is critical to understand that vendors can take advantage
not only of generally known cognitive biases and dispositions, but also exploit
temporary and idiosyncratic biases of speciﬁc consumers.
5. Overt inﬂuence: advertising
The most overt (and hence well-known) forms of technological inﬂuence in
online commerce concern advertising and, in particular, online behavioural
61See Nathan Newman, ‘Search, Antitrust and the Economics of the Control of User Data’ (2014) 31 Yale
Journal on Regulation 401, 444, 445, which describes the proﬁling of Internet users to detect ﬁnancial
ignorance and exploit such.
62Calo (n 12) 999.
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advertising. The latter concept is understood as the practice of selecting adver-
tisements – or entire advertising campaigns – on the basis of consumer online
behaviour. Online advertising illustrates how technology can amplify, or
change, a longstanding commercial practice and exacerbate pre-existing risks
to consumer autonomy. Traditional advertising is characterised by limited
effectiveness, which is attributable to its reliance on crude demographic differ-
entiations, such as gender, age, family status or income. In contrast, online
advertising caters to the heterogeneity of the audience, targeting individuals
on the basis of their distinct characteristics.63 Online businesses are capable of
directing their commercial messages to ﬁne-grained, ad hoc segments, speciﬁc
consumers or even so-called ‘transient intra-individual variations’, caused by
differences in personal situation or physiology.64 In the latter instance, adver-
tisements can be tailored to the various states a consumer goes through
during the day. Advertising strategies are also becoming increasingly sensitive
to differences in neuro-anatomy and physiology (so-called neuro-segmenta-
tion), which underpin individual decision-making and shopping habits.65
Online advertising relies on two discrete technological capabilities: to
identify consumers with speciﬁc characteristics and to dynamically adapt
the content (including the manner of its presentation) to such consumer.66
A consumer’s individual susceptibility to different persuasion strategies can
be monitored in real-time so that he can be targeted more effectively
during the same online session, in later sessions or even on different web-
sites.67 Alternatively, businesses can not so much tailor their persuasion strat-
egy to the consumer but ﬁnd the consumer who is most susceptible, ie likely to
respond, to a particular strategy.68 It is worth pointing out that the actual
effectiveness of behavioural advertising in comparison to its traditional
counterpart remains controversial.69 Technology-enabled inﬂuence must,
however, be regarded as a broader concept than advertising. After all, we
do not associate the layout of a mall or supermarket with advertising although
both are aimed at inﬂuencing shopping behaviour.
A greater threat to autonomy is posed by those technologies that inﬂuence
consumer choices in an imperceptible manner. Once speciﬁc content is
63Maurits Kaptein and Dean Eckles, ‘Heterogenity in the Effects of Online Persuasion’ (2012) 26 Journal of
Interactive Marketing 176, 186; Dustin D Berger, ‘Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting’
(2011) 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal 3, 4.
64Kaptein and Eckles (n 63) 183.
65Leon Zurawicki, Neuromarketing, Exploring the Brain of the Consumer (Springer 2010).
66John Hauser and others, ‘Website Morphing’ (2009) 28(2) Marketing Science 202.
67Kaptein and Eckles (n 63) 186; see also BJ Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What
We Think and Do (Morgan Kaufmann 2003).
68Bala Deshpande, Predictive Analytics and Data Mining (O’Reilly 2014).
69See Avi Goldfarb and Catherine E Tucker, ‘Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising’ (4 August 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600259, who established that in Europe, where privacy laws have been
implemented, banner ads are reduced in effectiveness by 65% in terms of changing purchase intent.
Their data is, however, based on consumer surveys, not on actual conversions.
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identiﬁed as advertising, the average person displays some form of psycho-
logical resistance, recognising a ‘threat to behavioural freedom’.70 The inﬂu-
ence of advertising is thus generally limited by its easy detection.
Unsurprisingly, traditional advertising regulation is directed at disclosing
the fact that certain content is promotional or sponsored. Consumers are gen-
erally capable of detecting information bias and persuasive efforts in online
advertisements, like banner ads, even if the latter are targeted. Consumers
may, however, face difﬁculties when inﬂuence and information biases are
embedded into news, media, artistic content and social activity.71 The
problem is aggravated when consumption choices are inﬂuenced by some
parts of the Internet infrastructure or seemingly neutral online services.
Two examples concern the most important Internet services: search and, to
a certain extent, connectivity. Both illustrate the fact that consumer choices
can be shaped, to an unexpected extent, by the sequence of presentation of
available alternatives and the ease of accessing such alternatives.
6. Hidden inﬂuence: search
Search engines constitute gateways to the commercial use of the Internet, for
consumers and vendors alike.72 In fact, search engines may be regarded as
more important than the domain name system as consumers are more
likely to ‘Google’ a company or product than to type in the name of a particu-
lar website.
Originally, search services were not designed to represent commercial
interests but to assist in locating information.73 However, with the evolution
of the web into a commerce-driven environment and the crystallisation of
Google’s business model, search has gradually morphed from a relatively
neutral service of information discovery to one of content promotion. The
manner of presenting search results shapes the consumers’ view of the
online marketplace and directly affects which websites they visit and what
products they buy. As consumers generally consider only the top few
search results, even small differences in ranking may promote one business
at the expense of another or nudge consumers towards speciﬁc products.
Being listed past the ﬁrst page of results makes a website virtually invisible.
To clarify: search results do not hide websites. The links to websites remain
70Peter S Menell, ‘Brand Totalitarianism’ (2014) 47 UC Davis Law Review 787, 790.
71ibid 787; see also Ellen P Goodman, ‘Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity’ (2006) 85 Texas Law Review
83.
72For a technical description of search engines see Martin Cave and Howard Williams, ‘The Perils of Dom-
inance: Exploring the Economics of Search in the Information Society, Initiative for a Competitive Online
Marketplace’ (ICOMP) March 2011, www.i-comp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Economics-of-
Search.pdf
73See generally Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, ‘Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review 1149.
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accessible but their positioning decreases the likelihood of the website being
visited. In online commerce, ‘one click away’ is a huge distance.
As mentioned in the context of choice architectures, the manner of pre-
senting alternatives directly affects which alternative is chosen. Consumers
generally do not know how search results are determined and that search
engines favour certain sites.74 Two problems arise: ﬁrst, consumers may
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to distinguish between paid and organic results, ie between
results that constitute ‘search advertising’ and those that are supposed to con-
stitute the natural output of search algorithms. Search advertising refers to the
paid placement of links to websites at the top of the results list. Unlike banner
ads, which are graphically distinct from website content, search advertising is
not always easily distinguishable from organic results. At the same time, it
constitutes the most effective form of advertising as it targets the so-called
‘moment of intent’, ie consumers who overtly display a desire for a particular
product. The average consumer may not, however, understand that a vendor
ranks high because he has paid for the particular search term. He may mistake
the prominence for relevance, or worse, treat it as an implied
recommendation.
The second problem concerns so-called ‘search engine bias’, ie the priori-
tisation of certain websites in organic results.75 Contrary to popular belief,
search algorithms are not objective.76 Although their automatic operation
creates a semblance of impartiality, search engines exercise editorial control
over the sequence of results.77 The criteria deployed by the search algorithm
are the page’s popularity and the number of pages linking to it. While either
criterion may be criticised as catering to majority interests and promoting
sites that are already popular due to prior advertising expenditure, at least
there is consistency or minimal objectivity. The algorithm designed to
produce organic results is, however, not neutral but displays the ‘best’ or
‘most relevant’ results. What is ‘best’ or ‘most relevant’ is a subjective decision
made by the search engine operator, ie Google. Given the importance of
search advertising revenues, it is increasingly suspected that even organic
results favour sites that are more proﬁtable from an advertising perspective.78
As the main customers of companies like Google are not its users but adver-
tisers, the interests of the search engine operator and online consumer are not
74Cave and Williams (n 72) 33.
75I omit Search Engine Optimisation, as it is performed by website owners to improve their ranking in the
search results.
76See generally Stanford Encyclopedia of Ethics, ‘Search Engines and Ethics’, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/ethics-search/#SeaEngBiaProOpa (accessed November 30, 2015); LM Hinman, ‘Esse Est Indicato
in Google: Ethical and Political Issues in Search Engines’ (2005) 3 International Review of Information
Ethics 19.
77Eric Goldman, ‘Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism’ (2006) 8 Yale Journal of
Law and Technology 188.
78A Diaz, ‘Through the Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design’ in A Spink and M
Zimmer (eds), Web Search: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Springer-Verlag 2008) 11, 21.
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aligned. In addition, search engines also ‘personalise’ results to the user, creat-
ing a similar effect as behavioural advertising.79 To add to the confusion,
Google has been displaying its own products and services in prominent pos-
itions alongside organic results. From a cognitive perspective, such presen-
tation implies that the underlying selection mechanisms are equivalent.
Consequently, consumers assume that they are choosing from a range of
similar, if not identical, options.
7. Hidden inﬂuence: connectivity
The original Internet provided a uniform, best-effort transmission of all
content and could not distinguish between the different applications carried
by individual data packets. Technological developments have subsequently
enabled Internet access providers to detect the type of content carried on
their networks and to differentiate between its delivery times (‘trafﬁc manage-
ment’). As access providers have the ability to prioritise certain packets, they
inﬂuence not just the quality of services (eg video streaming) but also the
popularity of websites.
Trafﬁc management is commonly discussed under the label of ‘network
neutrality’, the controversy being whether access providers are allowed to dis-
criminate between types of trafﬁc and, in particular, whether they are allowed
to charge for prioritising certain applications or content.80 The common
concern is that such discrimination could create fast and slow lanes on the
network, undermine competition and the open character of the Internet.
For present purposes, it must be noted that users abandon websites with
slower load times.81 In e-commerce, download times correlate with conver-
sion rates. Microseconds count: faster-loading websites have more visitors
and more revenue. Unsurprisingly, the network neutrality debate recognises
that if some vendors were able to pay for their websites to display faster,
vendors without such resources would be sidelined. Unlike the inﬂuence
inherent in the operation of search engines, which concerns the sequence
and manner of presenting content, trafﬁc management concerns the ease of
retrieving content.
Although, in the US, the recently enacted network neutrality rules prohibit
paid prioritisation,82 two problems remain. First, network neutrality prin-
ciples do not extend to private networks, such as corporate networks or
79Google discretely introduced ‘personalised search’ in December 2009.
80For a recent discussion, see Barbara van Schewick, ‘Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 1.
81Radware, ‘Ecommerce Page Speed and Web Performance’, State of the Union, Summer 2015, www.
radware.com/assets/0/314/6442478110/bfc32d1a-890e-4fcc-9801-648ef5087b3d.pdf (accessed November
30, 2015).
82Federal Communications Commission, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Final Rule, April 13,
2015, Federal Register vol 70, rule 18, 19740.
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those provided in eg coffee shops or malls. Consumers using complimentary
Wi-Fi provided by Google in Starbucks are potentially exposed to techniques
that discriminate between types of trafﬁc and between websites. Second,
network neutrality rules prohibit discrimination on the core and access
network but do not prohibit technologies that prioritise content delivery on
the edges of the network. One such example is that of Content Distribution
Networks (‘CDN’), which store copies of content at multiple physical locations
in the Internet, accelerating access to that content.83 Although CDNs provides
as much opportunity to discriminate performance as trafﬁc management on
access networks, they enable ‘preferential access’ to content without violating
network neutrality principles.84 While online businesses do not have the
capacity to decelerate the websites of their competitors,85 those with more
ﬁnancial resources can distribute their content using CDNs and accelerate
their websites’ load times. Again, consumer choices are affected by a ‘techni-
cality’ – the number of seconds a website takes to appear on the screen.
8. The dangers of personalisation
The discussion would not be complete without a description of ‘personalisa-
tion’: the tailored, user-speciﬁc display of information. Personalisation is
known to increase the effectiveness of other technologies as it enables the
selection or adaptation of a persuasion strategy (in terms of content and pres-
entation) to speciﬁc consumers.86 Personalisation techniques are common not
only in advertising but also, more generally, in recommender systems, infor-
mation retrieval systems, shopping assistants and many other online services.
Different consumers are presented with different content despite having
entered the same search term or requested the same information.87 The
extreme effect of personalisation is that each online consumer sees a custo-
mised view of the marketplace.88 Personalisation is usually justiﬁed in
terms of ‘optimising content’ or ‘increasing relevance’.89 After all, the
83See generally Christopher S Yoo, ‘The Evolution of Internet Architecture: Innovations in the Internet’s
Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo’ (2010) 8 Journal Telecommunications & High Technology
Law 79.
84Dirk Grunwald, ‘The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination’ (2011) 63 Federal Communi-
cations Law Journal 411, 413, 425.
85Unless we examine Google Fibre in more detail…
86Shlomo Berkovsky, Jill Freyne, Harri Oinas-Kukkonen, ‘Inﬂuencing Individually: Fusing Personalisation
and Persuasion’ (2012) 2(2) ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, Article 9; Maurits
Kaptein and Dean Eckles, ‘Selecting Effective Means to Any End: Futures and Ethics of Persuasion Proﬁl-
ing’ in Thomas Ploug and others (eds), Persuasive Technology: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(Springer 2010) 82.
87Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You (Penguin Press 2011); Joseph Turow, The
Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Deﬁning Your Identity and Your Worth (Yale Press 2011) 88.
88Pasquale, The Black Box Society (n 2) 80.
89Eric Goldman, ‘A Coasean Analysis of Marketing’ (2006) Wisconsin Law Review 1151; see also Jerry Kang,
‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1193.
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average consumer is incapable of evaluating all the information available on
the Internet due to time constraints and, more importantly, limited processing
capabilities. Too many choices or an un-moderated access to information may
decrease the quality of decision-making due to cognitive overload.90
While some content moderation, or pre-selection, seems reasonable and
advantageous to the consumer, the problem lies in who decides which
content is ‘optimal’ or ‘relevant’ and how content is selected. With few excep-
tions, where websites allow consumers to customise certain display features,
content is personalised by the online business. It must be borne in mind
that personalisation techniques are directed at increasing proﬁts for the
online business not at facilitating consumer decisions. Personalisation
creates a false sense of familiarity and friendliness to entice consumers into
more transactions, not to enable them to pursue their individual interests.
References to ‘optimisation’ or ‘relevance’ are particularly misleading as
they not only imply that they occur for the consumer’s beneﬁt but also that
online businesses are capable of establishing or actually know consumer pre-
ferences. In reality, businesses infer such preferences from previously col-
lected data – not from direct instructions of the consumer.
Personalisation techniques often rely on predictive analytics, technologies
that learn from observed experience (eg information about online activities)
to predict future behaviour or, to be more precise, the likelihood of a particu-
lar consumer being inﬂuenced by a speciﬁc persuasion strategy.91 Predictive
analytics utilise large data sets (‘Big Data’) acquired from the online activity
of a particular customer, ‘similar’ customers and statistical data pertaining
to a particular product.
The popular fascination with ‘Big Data’ overshadows a number of pro-
blems. First, the data is often of questionable quality in terms of currency, rel-
evance and provenance. Quantity does not translate into quality.92 Second,
predictive analytics establish correlations not causal relationships. Conse-
quently, personalisation relies on the statistical likelihood of two events occur-
ring together – not on the deduction of actual consumer preferences. To
aggravate matters, the risk of false correlations increases with larger data
sets. Apart from the data itself, there is no guarantee that the technology
used to analyse it will correctly infer consumer preferences, make the
optimal recommendations or display the most relevant content.93 It cannot
‘know’ the long-term interests of the consumer, as apparent preferences at
90Simona Botti and Sheena S Iyengar, ‘The Dark Side of Choice: When Choice Impairs Social Welfare’ (2006)
25 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 24.
91E Siegel, Prediction Effect: How Predictive Analytics Revolutionises the Business World (Wiley & Sons 2013)
11, 200.
92Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘A Multifocal View of Human Agency in the Era of Autonomic Computing’ in Hil-
debrandt and Rouvroy (n 9) 1.
93For a critique of those systems see Kevin Miller, ‘Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime Tech-
nology: Privacy’s Perfect Storm’ (2014) 19 Journal of Technology Law & Policy 105.
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one point in time need not coincide with actual or long-term preferences.94
An understanding of such preferences would require that predictive analytics
were capable of establishing causal relationships. A false correlation based on
inaccurate data may still result in a transaction if the consumer trusts a given
recommendation. In effect, consumers who indiscriminately rely on the selec-
tion of options presented to them, may acquire suboptimal or squarely wrong
products.95 The beneﬁts of ‘Big Data’, if any, do not accrue to the individuals
whose data are collected, but to the businesses that utilise such data.96 The
personal information of the consumer is not used to discover his preferences
but to increase the likelihood of a transaction or determine the maximum
price he can be charged.
A classic example of personalisation is price steering and price discrimi-
nation.97 In the former instance, customers are nudged towards more expens-
ive items; in the latter, different consumers are presented with different prices
for the same product.98 The point is not that such practices are illegal. The
point is that personalisation technologies do not operate to the consumer’s
advantage. Personalisation aims to increase the likelihood of consumers inter-
acting with speciﬁc content or purchasing a particular product. It is therefore
naïve to assume that Amazon wants or is able to recommend the ideal book or
that Google can rank the most relevant website.99
More generally, personalisation may lead to a reduction of options result-
ing from a gradual limitation of access to information. Admittedly, the line
between facilitating and reducing choice is difﬁcult to draw. As some infor-
mation is prioritised and other becomes more difﬁcult to ﬁnd, customers
are less likely to learn about the existence of alternatives. The information
that is not displayed is not blocked or removed. The ‘hidden’ information
(speak: products, services, vendors) remains available; but, unless the consu-
mer speciﬁcally knows what he is looking for, it may be difﬁcult to ﬁnd. On a
practical level, the consumer may be precluded from ﬁnding the best price or
the product that best satisﬁes his preferences. On a theoretical level, his auton-
omy is limited as he is not given the opportunity to choose from – or become
aware of – the full range of available options. To clarify: it is not claimed that
more choices are necessarily better for decision-making. It is claimed,
however, that the mere awareness of the full range of choices may affect the
94Brownsword, ‘Agents’ (n 9) 70.
95Paul Ohm, ‘The Underwhelming Beneﬁts of Big Data’ (2013) 161 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Online 339.
96Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, ‘Big Data For All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics’
(2013) 11 Northwestern Journal Technology & Intellectual Property 239, 244.
97Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David Lazer, ‘Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-commerce
Web Sites’ (2014) ACM 978-1-4503-3213-2/14/11.
98For a detailed description of online discriminatory practices see Tal Z Zarsky, ‘Mine Your Own Business!”
Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public
Opinion’ (2002–2003) 5 Yale Journal of Law & Technology (Article 1) 19–22.
99Victor Meyer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data (John Murray 2013) 12.
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manner in which choices are made, even if a consumer never intends to evalu-
ate each available alternative. It is one thing to decide not to explore all pos-
sibilities, it is yet another not to know that many possibilities exist.
Interestingly, writing as early as 2002, Zarsky associated the customisation
of information with the restriction of choice and the loss of autonomy.100 He
described a vicious circle, or ‘autonomy trap’,101 that forms when customers
‘provide’ their information and in return vendors customise information to
the consumer’s perceived preferences. The information displayed to the con-
sumer is chosen on the basis of the information collected from the consumer.
The progressive narrowing of options may ‘push individuals towards certain
products or services in which they initially were not interested’.102 Similarly,
Hildebrandt observes that it is difﬁcult to assess what preferences a person
would have developed if her intent had not been pre-empted.103
9. The ‘nothing new’ argument
I anticipate the argument that the commercial practices described above are
not novel or that technological inﬂuences do not create new legal problems.
My argument, however, does not rest on novelty but on scale, effectiveness
and difference. It can be endlessly debated whether we are dealing with a
new legal problem or an old legal problem that has assumed new dimensions.
Arguably, even if we are ‘only’ dealing with more extreme forms of ‘old’ com-
mercial practices, their increased effectiveness in itself should raise legal
concerns.
We can concede that we have always been manipulated by advertisers and
sales people, and that our choices have always been limited to what owners of
malls or supermarkets decided to display. Malls, shops and the packaging of
goods have always been designed to inﬂuence our purchasing decisions. Malls,
shops and vending machines do not, however, change their layout and con-
tents in real-time to match speciﬁc individuals at crucial moments related
to their psychological or physiological states.104 Traditional transacting
environments cannot detect and exploit individual vulnerabilities.105 There
is fairness in the fact that everybody is presented with the same range of
choices in the same way. Every sales person faces limits as to what she can
directly observe from the interaction with the consumer. She does not
know the consumer’s prior purchasing history with other shops, his circle
of friends, his medical correspondence and his cognitive preferences. She
100Zarsky (n 98) 35.
101P Schwartz, ‘Internet Privacy and the State’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Review 815, 823.
102Zarsky (n 98) 43.
103Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law, Novel Entanglements of Law and Tech-
nology (Edward Elgar 2015) 69.
104Zarsky (n 98).
105Calo (n 12) 1033.
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can adapt the sales strategy to a limited range of consumer characteristics but,
leaving aside extreme examples, is unable to detect idiosyncratic vulnerabil-
ities. In recommending speciﬁc products, the sales person relies on her intui-
tion and experience – not on the combined experience derived from billions of
transactions. Some shops pay higher rent for space in high-trafﬁc areas, but
once the spaces have been allocated mall operators cannot promote certain
shops by making others more difﬁcult to access.
Of course, it is always possible to force comparisons and devise improbable
scenarios. For example, the mall owner could slow down the escalator to make
certain shops less accessible or channel trafﬁc to speciﬁc areas by means of
promotions. Such scenarios can be regarded as desperate attempts to analo-
gise and ignore the differences. An over-zealous recourse to analogy may con-
strain our reasoning and pre-empt the identiﬁcation of a problem, especially if
we focus on the familiar features of the online environment while ignoring
those that we do not understand.106 Unquestionably, commercial websites
can be compared to shops or malls. We can focus on the similarities: in
both instances a range of goods is presented for sale. We can also focus on
the differences. Apart from the obvious ones, such as automation and lack
of direct human contact, the cognitive and sensory experience of navigating
web interfaces differs from walking around supermarkets. Browsing the
Amazon app differs from browsing a physical bookstore. Amazon is not a
shop but a symbolic abstraction of a shop. There is a tendency to conﬂate
physical objects with their graphic representations, the ‘real thing’ with its
model. Unsurprisingly, interface design often facilitates interactions by
simulating off-line experiences with familiar clues, such as virtual shopping
carts.107 The web must be recognised as a discrete transacting environment,
where consumers process and interact with information differently
than ofﬂine, and where they are subject to different, more powerful
inﬂuences.108
Similarity is not equivalence and differences may be more important than
similarities. Lessig famously parodies the debate: we can say that a cat is like a
lion. But it is not a lion.109 We let our children play with cats, but not with
lions. Moreover, would we let our children play with genetically modiﬁed
cats with longer claws and stronger jaws? Would such animals still be cats?
Adding sharper claws to a ‘cat’ changes the assumptions we make about the
safety of playing with them, although the main difference lies ‘only’ in
106See, generally, Dan Hunter, ‘Reason is too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law’ (2001) 50 Emory Law
Journal 1197, 1216.
107Andrew Hinton, Understanding Context: Environment, Language and Information Architecture (O’Reilly
2015) 219.
108Sylvain Senecal, ‘Consumers’ Decision-Making Process and Their Online Shopping Behavior: A Click-
stream Analysis’ (2005) 58 Journal of Business Research 1599, 1605.
109Lawrence Lessig ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach Us’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law Review
501, 529.
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effectiveness: the cat becomes better at killing mice (and scratching children).
Similarly, ‘enhancing’ longstanding commercial practices with technology
may destroy the traditional risk allocation between the transacting parties
or challenge the original assumptions underlying the relevant legal prin-
ciples.110 Ofﬂine, consumers are accustomed to a wide range of commercial
inﬂuences, such as intrusive marketing campaigns. Such inﬂuences are
widely recognised and, as most consumers develop the ability to ignore
them, limited in their ability to affect choice. The shift online challenges the
assumption that consumers can detect and thus neutralise persuasive intent
or information bias, not just because of the type but also the amount of inﬂu-
ences. In sum, there is nothing new in the fact that businesses try to inﬂuence
consumption choices. It is the differences in the available tools and in the
characteristics of the online environment that warrant legal attention.
10. A contractual perspective
Even a cursory review of the contract law literature reveals a persistent
emphasis on self-determination and autonomy. Liberal individualism, the
ideology underlying classical contract law, regards each individual as an inde-
pendent agent who enjoys the right to freedom from interference by other
individuals. The only qualiﬁcation of the pursuit of one’s interests is the
need to observe the similar right of others. At the same time, however, con-
tract law is often regarded as a framework for individuals to maximise their
welfare and achieve their private ends. There is thus an inevitable tension
between the right to pursue one’s interests and the need to respect the auton-
omy of others. While it is assumed that existing law is generally capable of
addressing most problems pertaining to technological change,111 it must be
acknowledged that technology-related transactional imbalances introduce
an additional dimension to the aforementioned tension.
It is, of course, impossible to delineate where the autonomy of one trans-
acting party starts to limit the autonomy of the other, but it must be assumed
that ‘transgressions’ are more likely to occur when a transactional imbalance
is present. In contract law, the problem is approached as one of defective
consent. Although neither subjective nor informed consent are prerequisites
of enforceability, its absence may entitle the aggrieved party to various
forms of relief, including the reversal of the transaction. Arguably, some tech-
nological limitations of autonomy call for the availability of such relief. While
it is tempting to bypass the protections available under contract law and move
110Other ﬁtting examples are the technological challenges to the fourth amendment (protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures): the sheriff may enhance his vision with spectacles but is he
allowed to use x-ray vans?
111L Bennet Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race To Keep Up With Technological Change’ (2007)
University of Illinois Journal Law Technology & Policy 239, 244.
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straight to regulatory solutions, it must not be forgotten that the latter should
only be debated when existing rules are unable to provide a solution.112 More-
over, new regulatory instruments should preserve the original allocation of
rights and responsibilities and be clear about the values that require protec-
tion. It is thus necessary to identify the permissible degrees of inﬂuence, or
transactional exploitation, in contract law.
At the outset, it must be emphasised that there is no single comprehensive
legal doctrine that addresses fairness in the transacting process.113 The main,
overriding principle is that the statements of the transacting parties are eval-
uated objectively and a contract comes into existence if both parties appear to
have agreed on a given transaction.114 The objective theory of contract pro-
tects the reliance of those to whom the words and behaviour are directed
and overrides any subjective defects in contractual intention. The need to
protect commercial certainty generally trumps the desire to protect the auton-
omy of each transacting party. There are, however, a closed number of excep-
tions to the objective principle, popularly referred to as ‘vitiating factors’. The
latter can be regarded as circumscribing the fairness of the transacting process
in negative terms or setting the limits on the permissible pursuit of self-inter-
est in contract law.115 And so, the doctrines of duress, misrepresentation, uni-
lateral mistake, undue inﬂuence and unconscionable dealings address
distortions of transaction-related information or legally objectionable
inﬂuences.
Some doctrines focus on deﬁciencies in knowledge, others on the context in
which a decision was formulated.116 Given the lack of a clear differentiation
between informed and free consent,117 contract law recognises that some
deﬁciencies in the formation process do not concern information failures
but more complex, cognitive factors that affect the origin of the decision.118
In particular, the doctrines of duress and undue inﬂuence are regarded as pro-
tecting the ability of ‘autonomous beings’ to ‘make choices for him or herself
without unjustiﬁable interference from others’.119 Although, theoretically,
substantive unfairness of the resulting transaction need not be a prerequisite
of intervention, relief is generally sought only when such unfairness is present.
Each vitiating factor has developed independently, deals with a different
aspect of transactional unfairness and, given that each is treated as an
112L Bennett Moses, ‘Adapting the Law to Technological Change: A Comparison of Common Law and
Legislation’ (2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 394, 402.
113See Lord Denning MR in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, 339, laid to rest by Lord Scarman in
National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] 1 AC 686, 708.
114Lord Diplock in Paal Wilson & Co A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal [1983] 1 AC 854, 915.
115Rick Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (OUP 2003) 92.
116Hart (n 6) 175, 176.
117Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘The Nature of Vitiating Factors in Contract Law’ in Gregory Klass and others (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 296.
118PS Atiyah, ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ (1985) 35 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 15.
119Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 164 Australian Law Report 606, 635 (McHugh J).
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exception to the broader principle of objectivity, has its own narrowly formu-
lated criteria of application that developed in a piecemeal fashion.
Before testing the possibility of subsuming problems of technological inﬂu-
ence under one of the vitiating factors, some general observations are necess-
ary to place such inﬂuences within the narrative of contract law. First, the
number of intermediaries involved in an online transaction and the resulting
multiplicity of inﬂuences creates difﬁculties in establishing those businesses
that exert the most relevant technological inﬂuence. Once a contract is con-
cluded, relief can be sought against the other party to the transaction,
placing other intermediaries – even if they caused the decision – outside
the purview of contract law. It may also be difﬁcult to prove that but for a
speciﬁc inﬂuence, the customer would have entered into a different transaction
or abandoned his transactional intent altogether. Second, it is assumed that
when evaluating the possibility of relief the focus must not be on the internal
state of a consumer’s mind but on the external indicia of inﬂuence: the sub-
stance of the transaction and/or the process that produced it. As it is generally
assumed that a fair contracting process will lead to fair results,120 the sub-
stance of a transaction may raise suspicions about the process.
Two problems arise with regard to substantive unfairness. First, leaving
aside extreme cases of disproportionate bargains, substantive unfairness
may be difﬁcult to establish given the lack of objective standards and the
fact that contract law relies on a purely subjective understanding of value.
Equivalence of exchange is not required. Similarly, deviations from the
market price need not evince transactional irregularities. Second, in many
online transactions the problem lies in the very conclusion, or presence, of a
transaction, not in its substance. The unfairness concerns the manipulation
of choice, not the transaction resulting from such choice. The consumer
buys X instead of Y or Z because X was presented in the most conducive
manner and Y was concealed or rendered less ‘discoverable’. X may constitute
a reasonable bargain, yet the consumer’s autonomy is compromised because
he was precluded from evaluating and making other choices. In other words,
the substance of the transaction in itself may not evince the presence of inﬂu-
ence; rather, the latter will only become apparent once a consumer learns of
the availability of other choices.
We must acknowledge, however, that it is equally problematic to establish
procedural fairness as it is to describe substantive fairness.121 The traditional
transacting process is far from ideal. Most contracts are formed in sub-
optimal conditions characterised by imbalances in power and information.
Relief is never granted on the ground that one party enjoyed a bargaining
advantage. The contracting process is inherently adversarial and
120Bigwood (n 115) 82, citing Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, 634.
121See, generally, Atiyah (n 118) 19.
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antagonistic.122 There are relatively few norms delimiting what the parties can
‘do to each other’ during the interactions leading to contract formation. Con-
tract law implicitly permits a certain level of advantage-taking, including a
certain level of deception. Everything depends on the context, including the
reasonable expectations of the parties. Absent a general duty of disclosure,
some forms of misinformation can be regarded as bargaining techniques,
which are expected to be countered with similar techniques and/or with an
awareness that what is communicated may not be factually correct.123 One
party is also permitted to ignore the informational deﬁciencies or misconcep-
tions of the other as long as he did not directly cause or is otherwise under a
duty to repair them. It is, however, considered objectionable to deliberately
manipulate the factual assumptions relied on by the other party in deciding
whether to enter into a contract or to induce her to act on inaccurate or
incomplete information. The difﬁculty lies in establishing the point at
which the transacting process is compromised. While each party is allowed
and expected to engage in its own bargaining tactics, it is also assumed that
each party is able to recognise and, at least to an extent, counter the bargaining
strategy of the other.
In online transactions, the consumer may be unable to recognise such
‘tactics’ and act under the false assumption that there are none. The
average consumer can hardly be expected to understand that a particular
colour was selected to induce him to proceed within the website or that his
personal information is used to detect his predispositions. Neither can he
be expected to counter the strategy of the online business. It must,
however, be pointed out that bargaining advantages based on superior nego-
tiation skills or access to better information, are permitted, especially if such
advantages are attributable to a party’s investment of resources to acquire
such information. Objections are, however, more common when an advan-
tage is obtained by technological (speak: artiﬁcial) rather than social or econ-
omic means.124 After all, some technologies used by online businesses bring to
mind pharmacological performance enhancements in sports or education. In
the present context, it is not only the source of the transactional advantage in
online transactions that is objectionable, but its speciﬁc aim. We must recall
that online businesses invest in technological capabilities and amass consumer
information (a) to detect idiosyncratic vulnerabilities and dispositions that
would have (in most instances) remained hidden, and (b) to exploit the
foregoing.
With the above in mind, we can examine the applicability of the individual
vitiating factors to technological limitations of autonomy. It is assumed that
122Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138 (Lord Ackner).
123Bigwood (n 115) 49.
124Lyria Bennet Moses, ‘How to Think About Law, Regulation and Technology: Problems With Technology
as A Regulatory Target’ (2013) 5(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 1, 17.
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duress is irrelevant as it requires the presence of a wrongful or illegitimate
threat.125 The latter will be absent in online transactions as most technologies
operate imperceptibly, by inﬂuencing online consumers with friendly inter-
faces, not with overt pressure.
The doctrine of misrepresentation seems more suitable as it concerns situ-
ations where one party makes false statements of fact that induce the other to
enter into a contract. The representation need not be express and may derive
from the cumulative effect of statements and conduct.126 The practical appli-
cability of the doctrine is, however, limited by the requirement that the rep-
resentation be material and affect the judgment of a reasonable person or
induce such person to enter into the contract without making further inqui-
ries. Inducement, or materiality, is judged objectively, according to the impact
it may be expected to have on a reasonable addressee ‘in the position and with
the known characteristics of the actual representee’.127 If a representation is
implied, it becomes necessary to establish what a reasonable person would
have inferred from the words or conduct.128 In principle, it appears possible
to claim that a consumer was induced to rely on some information rather than
on other by eg the manner of its presentation, especially if we allow for the fact
that representations can be personalised to speciﬁc consumers with ‘known
characteristics’. It may, however, be difﬁcult to distinguish between active
concealment of information and a ‘mere’ reduction of its visibility. In both
scenarios, the consumer retains the ability to access other information and
thus the ability to conﬁrm the veracity of a representation. While the presence
of an opportunity to discover the truth does not preclude relief,129 in some
circumstances the addressee may be reasonably expected to make further
inquiries130 or be regarded as having taken a deliberate risk as to the truth
of matter.131 It must be acknowledged that while online businesses may
provide information in a manner that renders it unlikely to be viewed, consu-
mers may decide not to inform themselves or negligently assume that they are
presented with best options. Everything will depend on the context and the
website or online service in question. Where the consumer has a pre-existing
contractual relationship with the business (eg Amazon) or service provider
(Google), the contract may describe the exact terms on which information
is provided or exclude liability for misrepresentations.132 In principle,
125The Siboen and the Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Report 293; The Atlantic Baron [1979] QB 705.
126Spice Girls v Aprilia [2002] EWCA Civ 15.
127MCI Worldcomm International v Primus Telecommunications plc [2004] EWCA Civ 957 [30]; Reifeissen Zen-
tralbank Osterriech v Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] EWHC 1392 [8].
128I F E Fund SA v Goldman Sachs International [2007] EWCA Civ 811 [50].
129Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 ChD 1.
130Peekay v ANZ Group plc (2006) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511; Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831.
131Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel: The Law of Contract (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 370; Avon Insurance Plc v
Swire Fraser Ltd [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 573 [200].
132BSkyB v HP Enterprises Services UK Ltd [2010] EWHC 86 (TCC).
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misrepresentation requires factual falsity and seems less adaptable to deal with
incompleteness, ambiguity, manipulative presentation formats or exploita-
tions of cognitive biases. Also, relief can only be sought against the person
who made the representation.
Another doctrine, mistake, deals with misconceptions and false assump-
tions entertained by one of the parties.133 The mistake must pertain to the
terms of the speciﬁc contract, not to the surrounding facts. It must also
induce the contract: there is not relief if a party has taken the risk that the
facts are not as he supposed them to be.134 Unilateral mistake is thus unlikely
to be of practical relevance in the present context. The consumer’s belief that
he was ‘getting the best deal’ or that he was provided with all available options
will remain inconsequential. At the same time, everything may turn on the
ﬁne distinction between a vendor warranting that the price was the lowest
or the selected content most relevant.135 Relief may be also be available
when a mistake is negligently induced by eg the confusing presentation of a
product in a situation where the buyer cannot be reasonably expected to dis-
cover the true state of affairs.136 In the latter scenario, courts inquire whether
the mistaken party made a ‘natural inference’ from the information pre-
sented.137 Relief may also be available if the non-mistaken party knew (or
should have known) of the other party’s mistake. Such knowledge may,
however, be difﬁcult to establish despite the fact that the online business
may have information about a particular consumer. Knowledge of a
mistake need not automatically derive from knowledge of actual intentions
or preferences. It is imaginable, however, that where an online business
knows the consumer’s purchase intent and induces him into a transaction
that is inconsistent with such intent but more proﬁtable for the business, it
will not be protected by the objective principle.
Given its name, the doctrine of undue inﬂuence seems particularly attrac-
tive in context of online transactions, especially as it addresses cases where
‘inﬂuence is acquired and abused’138 and protects people from being
‘tricked or mislead’.139 It does not deal with the question whether somebody
knew what he was doing but how a decision was produced.140 Although,
prima facie, it appears to encompass technological inﬂuences, an examination
of the cases reveals its restrictive application. Presumed undue inﬂuence
requires the presence of a relationship of trust and conﬁdence and a trans-
action that is not explicable by ordinary motives. It is, however, difﬁcult to
133Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161, 217; it is assumed that only unilateral mistake may be of some relevance.
134Wales v Wadham [1977] 1 WLR 199, 200.
135Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597.
136Scriven Bros v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564.
137ibid 569.
138Smith v Kay (1859) 7 HLC 750, 779.
139Allcard v Skinner (1887) LR 36 ChD 145, 182.
140Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507; Hugvenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves Jun 273.
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establish the presence of such a relationship between online consumers and
businesses as trust and conﬁdence – and the corollary duty to safeguard the
other party’s interest – are uncommon in commercial relationships. It will
also be difﬁcult to meet the second prerequisite: the fact that a customer pur-
chased one item instead of another hardly requires explanation. Actual undue
inﬂuence, which requires neither a special relationship nor the presence of a
transaction that ‘requires explanation’, presumes coercion or actual pressure.
As indicated, both are absent.
While it is artiﬁcial to compare business-to-consumer transactions to
relationships between husbands and wives, it must be acknowledged that
online transactions often involve an abuse of inﬂuence and a deliberate suppres-
sion of information in a decision-making context.141 There may be no relation-
ships of trust and conﬁdence in online commerce but there are relationships of
dependence for information – and dependence seems more prone to abuse than
‘mere’ inﬂuence. A more ﬂexible approach to the type of relationship combined
with a focus on the defendant’s conduct, would acknowledge the business’ inten-
tionnot just to inﬂuence but to exploit the consumer.Given the complexity of the
relationships in which abuses of inﬂuence can occur, one can only agree with
Chen-Wishart that a multidimensional approach to evaluating such relation-
ships is needed.142 Given the exceptional and equitable character of undue inﬂu-
ence, the likelihood of its ‘expansion’ to technological inﬂuences is minimal.
A similar concern can be expressedwith regard to the doctrine of unconscion-
able dealings, which is of limited signiﬁcance, at least in England.143 There is no
general equitable jurisdiction to interfere with bargains on the basis of their
unfairness, processual or substantive. Relief is circumscribedby the requirements
of oppressiveness (ie substantive unfairness),144 the customer suffering from
certain types of bargaining weakness and the other party acting unconscionably
by intentionally taking advantage of such weakness. The doctrine is less restric-
tive in Australia where it has shifted from the protection of weak individuals145
towards the detection of exploitative conduct by stronger transacting parties.146
141Hewett v First Plus Financial Group Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 312; Royal Bank of Scotland v Chandra [2011]
EWCA Civ 192.
142Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Inﬂuence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing towards a Rela-
tional Analysis’ in Andrew Burrows and Lord Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law (Oxford University Press
2011) 201.
143English courts formulated the equitable jurisdiction in very narrow terms: Fry v Lane (1888) 40 ChD 312;
in Hart v O’Connor [1985] 1 AC 1000, the Privy Council described an unconscionable bargain as being one
of an ‘improvident character made by your poor or ignorant person acting without independent advice
which cannot be shown to be fair and reasonable transaction’. More recently, see Boustany v Pigott
(1993) 69 P&CR 298, 303; Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221; Jones v
Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995; See, generally, David Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the
Common Law World’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 403, 404–405.
144Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy [1975] QB 326.
145O’Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814; Beynon v Cook (1875) LR Ch App 389.
146See, in Australia, Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447.
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The preceding paragraphs have demonstrated that in most circumstances
the technological inﬂuences and transactional imbalances encountered in
online transactions are difﬁcult to subsume under any of the vitiating
factors. Contract law reveals an unexpected level of tolerance to practices
that a reasonable man would ﬁnd intuitively objectionable. Absent overt
pressure, technological inﬂuences seem too subtle to be registered on the
radar of traditional protective mechanisms – despite the fact that they
affect (or: attack) one of the central values of contract law: autonomy. It is
imaginable to combine certain elements from different vitiating factors to
create a broader, more ﬂexible protection against transactional exploitation.
In principle, however, courts are unlikely to create new doctrines or
commit ‘doctrinal jumps’ to provide relief for cases of technology-related
inﬂuence – especially if no clear substantive unfairness is present.
11. A regulatory perspective
If technological inﬂuence and the accompanying problems concerning consu-
mer autonomy are seen as a systemic problem, it appears more appropriate to
approach them from a broader regulatory perspective. After all, we are not
dealing with isolated incidents of transactional unfairness but with entire
industries centred on designing, testing and deploying technologies that can
erode or annihilate consumer autonomy.
Unfortunately, even if we agree that regulatory safeguards are needed, it
may be difﬁcult to devise such in practice. Intuitively, we would assume
that endowing consumers with more information about and control over
the technologies they encounter in online commerce would alleviate many
problems of technological inﬂuence.147 Knowing that one’s behaviour is
being inﬂuenced decreases the impact of such inﬂuence. Moreover, under-
standing the operation of a particular technology enables the consumer to
evaluate the implications and risks of its use.148 Consumers with a minimal
comprehension of search engines or recommender systems may appreciate
their inherent bias and, accordingly, place less reliance on the sequence or
presentation of results and, for example, skip the ﬁrst pages or ignore the
recommendations.
The picture is, however, more complex. Providing information about the
functioning of a particular technology is synonymous with the imposition
of disclosure requirements. Most regulatory instruments relying on disclosure
assume that consumers, given the opportunity to inform themselves, will take
this opportunity and make better decisions.149 Such an assumption is
147Friedman and Niessenbaum (n 13) 467.
148de Mul and van den Berg (n 17) 53; ICOMP Imperatives for a Healthy, Secure and Competitive Internet at 4.
149Lisa Waddington, ‘Vulnerable and Confused: The Protection of “Vulnerable” Consumers under EU Law’
(2013) 38 European Law Review 757, 776.
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incorrect. It seems counterintuitive to provide the consumer with more infor-
mation in an environment that is already information-rich and further con-
tribute to his information overload.150 Disclosing information explaining
the functioning of an online service would suffer the same fate as terms of
use, privacy policies and cookie notiﬁcations. Moreover, even if some features
of online service can be controlled in the user settings, such customisations
presume a pre-existing awareness of the problems inherent in its operation
as well as a minimal level of IT literacy. Less technically inclined consumers
will not beneﬁt from greater levels of control. Control requires competence.
Consequently, most consumers will retain the default settings provided by
the business.
While it cannot be denied that transparency and control theoretically pre-
serve autonomy, the practical limitations of both approaches must be appreci-
ated. What is needed are actual prohibitions – not more information.
Assuming that it may be easier to update an existing instrument than draft
one ‘from scratch’, it is best to identify a ‘candidate’ for potential adaptation.
Such a candidate would not rely on disclosure but restrict or ban certain prac-
tices. It appears that only one of the existing regulations affecting online com-
merce addresses some of the technology-related problems: the Directive on
Unfair Commercial Practices (‘UCPD’).151
In contrast with other Directives concerning online transactions, which
predominantly focus on the provision of information,152 the UCPD seeks
to enable consumers to make not only informed but also meaningful
choices153 and it prohibits some practices without any qualiﬁcations. The
UCPD governs all business-to-consumer commercial practices,154 but only
provides for public enforcement, as contract matters are excluded from its
operation. Article 5 contains a general prohibition of unfair commercial prac-
tices. A practice is unfair if: (a) it is contrary to the requirements of pro-
fessional diligence, and (b) materially distorts or is likely to materially
distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer. ‘Professional dili-
gence’ is associated with concepts like ‘honest market practice’ and ‘good
faith’. Article 5 constitutes a stand-alone prohibition covering any unfair prac-
tice, which is not caught by other provisions. Its generality aims to ensure that
150See, generally, Omri Ben-Shahar, More Than You Wanted To Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure
(Princeton University Press 2014).
151Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, adopted in the UK (almost verbatim)
by the Consumer Protections from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
152Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer
rights, see speciﬁcally: arts 5, 6, 7, 8.
153See, generally, Report From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council And The Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee, Brussels, 14.3.2013 COM(2013) 139 ﬁnal.
154UCPD art 2(d).
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the Directive is ‘future proof’.155 A material distortion occurs when a practice
impairs the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision, ‘causing the
consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken other-
wise’.156 The term ‘transactional decision’ is interpreted broadly157 and
includes decisions that do not lead to transactions or result in actions, which
have no legal consequences under national contract law.158 For example, a prac-
tice may be considered unfair if it is likely to cause the consumer to enter a shop,
spend more time engaged in an online booking process or decide not to switch
to another trader or product.159 Problems of establishing causation are alle-
viated as it is irrelevant whether the consumer’s economic behaviour has actu-
ally been distorted. The question is whether a practice is capable of having such
effect.160 Moreover, the material distortion requires neither actual economic
loss nor substantive unfairness: the consumer need not prove that the commer-
cial practice caused him to purchase something that he would have not pur-
chased otherwise or that he is worse off after the transaction.161 ‘Distortion’
concerns the impairment of the ability to make decisions.162
While the breadth of Article 5 appears to encompass even less extreme
cases of technological inﬂuence, problems arise with regard to the assump-
tions underpinning the term ‘average consumer’. The latter is deemed to be
reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect,163 behaving
‘like a rational economic operator’ and making efﬁcient choices.164 Conse-
quently, the effectiveness of the protections is diminished by false assump-
tions and unrealistic expectations about the information processing
capabilities and rationality of online consumers. It is particularly disconcert-
ing that the ECJ emphasised that the concept of ‘average consumer’ did not
depend on statistical evidence of how consumers actually behave. In an
environment where most decisions are data-driven, it seems counterintuitive
not to take advantage of empirical ﬁndings to establish actual consumer
behaviour. In its present form, the concept of ‘average consumer’ not only
ignores the manner in which consumers act in practice165 but also disregards
155Guiseppe B Abbamonte, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and its General Prohibition’ in
Stephen Weatherill and Ulf Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive
2005/29 (Hart 2007) 11.
156UCPD art 2(e).
157UCPD art 2(k).
158European Commission Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair
Commercial Practices (‘Guidance’) 23.
159Guidance, 24.
160Guidance, 24.
161Abbamonte (n 155) 23.
162UCPD art 2(e).
163UCPD Recital 18.
164Abbamonte (n 155) 24.
165See, generally, R Incardona and C Poncibò, ‘The Average Consumer, the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive, and the Cognitive Revolution’ (2007) 30 Journal of Consumer Policy 21; J Stuyck, E Terryn
and T Van Dyck, ‘Conﬁdence through Fairness? The New Directive on Unfair Business-to-Consumer Com-
mercial Practices in the Internal Market’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 107; Law Commission
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the very ﬁndings in behavioural economics and cognitive science that online
businesses rely on to inﬂuence consumer behaviour. If certain cognitive biases
are known to affect most market participants and if they are commonly
exploited it is dangerous to pretend they do not exist.
Article 5(3) also requires speciﬁc protection of consumers who are particu-
larly vulnerable due their mental or physical inﬁrmity, age or credulity, if the
commercial practice affects their economic behaviour in a way, which the
trader could reasonably be expected to foresee. The problem is that the
listed sources of vulnerability disregard the fact that ‘vulnerability’ can be a
‘dynamic state’ which affects consumers at different times and in different cir-
cumstances.166 Vulnerability derives from a multitude of causes, both
‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’,167 permanent and temporary. Waddington
emphasises that it can arise out of speciﬁc interactions and be created by
the environment in which the interactions occur.168 To adapt Article 5 to
actual market practice, regulators must acknowledge that: the ‘average’ consu-
mer is far less knowledgeable and rational than assumed, that there is no
‘average consumer’ and/or that even an ‘average consumer’ can be rendered
‘vulnerable’. It must be also recognised that each consumer can be vulnerable
in its own way and that vendors have the technological capacity to exploit
temporary vulnerabilities – not just those caused by age, mental inﬁrmity
or credulity. In sum, the protections introduced in Article 5 are weakened
by unrealistic expectations regarding consumer behaviour.
Article 6 prohibits the provision of false information or correct infor-
mation presented in a manner that deceives or is likely to deceive. The mis-
leading character of a commercial practice is assessed by reference to the
current state of scientiﬁc knowledge, including recent ﬁndings in behavioural
economics.169 Accordingly, the UCPD addresses practices that are capable of
deceiving consumers ‘in any way, including overall presentation’, even if the
information is factually correct.170 Unfortunately, the prohibition is restricted
to information concerning the existence, nature or characteristics of a product
or a vendor171 – it does not extend to information concerning the range of
products or vendors and bypasses the process of choosing between options.
At the same time, Annex 1 blacklists the provision of materially inaccurate
Consultation Paper No 199 ‘Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices’, para 2.46
quoting S Weatherill, ‘The Role Of The Informed Consumer In European Community Law and Policy’
(1994) 2 Consumer Law Journal 49.
166Waddington (n 149) 768; see also T Wilhelmsson, ‘The Informed Consumer v the Vulnerable Consumer
in European Unfair Commercial Practices Law: A Comment’ in G Howells and others (eds), The Yearbook
of Consumer Law 2007 (Ashgate 2007) 218.
167Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Report on a strategy for strengthening the
rights of vulnerable consumers (2011/2272/(INI), May 8, 2012, A7-0155/2012).
168Waddington (n 149).
169Guidance, 32.
170Guidance, 32.
171Art 6(1), 6(2).
34 E. MIK
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:5
5 0
5 M
ay
 20
16
 
information on market conditions or the availability of product ‘with the
intention of inducing the consumer to acquire the product at conditions
less favorable than normal market conditions’.172 Although the provision
seems capable of broad interpretation, it seems to address the misrepresenta-
tion concerning the popularity or scarcity of speciﬁc products, not commer-
cially biased search rankings or recommendations.
Article 7(1) refers to omissions of material information that causes, or that
is likely to cause, a decision that would otherwise not have been taken. If inter-
preted as a standalone provision, it could address some forms of personalisa-
tion. Article 7(2) addresses manipulative ways of presenting information,
including the failure to identify commercial intent.173 Unfortunately, the
omissions are conﬁned to information concerning speciﬁc products, not the
existence of other products.
Articles 8 and 9 prohibit aggressive commercial practices that impair or are
likely to impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice with regard to the
product and cause him or are likely to cause him to take a transactional decision
that he would not have taken otherwise.174 In particular, the provisions prohibit
‘undue inﬂuence’ and deﬁne it as an exploitation of power ‘so as to apply
pressure, even without using or threatening to use physical force’.175 Although
Article 9(c) recognises that businesses may aim to exploit speciﬁc misfortunes
or circumstances to inﬂuence the consumer’s transactional decision,176 the pro-
vision is not likely to be of practical relevance as it is circumscribed by the deﬁ-
nition of ‘undue inﬂuence’, which requires the presence of pressure.
In sum, the main weaknesses of the UCPD lie in the deﬁnitions and
assumptions underlying the concepts of ‘average’ and ‘vulnerable’ consumers
as well as the narrow deﬁnition of ‘undue inﬂuence’. While the Directive
appreciates the importance of presenting information, it fails to address the
problems inherent in misleading rankings and recommendations. Despite
these deﬁciencies, which are largely attributable to the fact that the Directive
was drafted before the technological capabilities of online businesses became
apparent, it can be assumed that the UCPD can be adapted to accommodate
even more subtle forms of manipulation.
The easiest approach would be to address the problems inherent in the
concept of ‘average consumer’. Its redeﬁnition alone would obviate the
need to introduce more far-reaching or technology-speciﬁc changes.
Although some shortcomings of the UCPD have been recognised by the
Law Commission,177 the European Commission stated that the Directive
172UCPD Annex I, point 18.
173See also UCPD Annex 1, point 22.
174UCPD art 8.
175UCPD art 2(j).
176UCPD art 9(c), (d).
177The Law Commission Consultation Paper No 199 ‘Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive
Practices’.
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need not be updated as ‘no new practices which are not covered by the Direc-
tive have been identiﬁed’.178 For the time being, consumers in the EU can
resort to the right of withdrawal granted to them by the Directive on Consu-
mer Rights.179 Instead of seeking relief under private law doctrines or report-
ing speciﬁc practices to the relevant regulatory body, consumers have a period
of 14 days to withdraw from the contract, without giving any reason. This ‘sol-
ution’ provides an indirect way to counterbalance the technology-related
transactional imbalances inherent in the online environment. While the
right of withdrawal cannot be regarded as a long-term solution, it can
address the more egregious forms of exploitation, such as price discrimination
or the targeting of consumers who are prone to compulsive purchases.
12. Final observations
It is often pointed out that we tend to tolerate certain practices online that we
would never tolerate ofﬂine. A common example is the tracking of online user
behaviour. It is observed, half-jokingly, that no sane adult would accept being
followed and observed by dozens of people whenever he went to the super-
market. The same practice does not, however, seem to bother us if it
happens online. What is more pertinent in the present context is that
online businesses have the technological means not only to follow us but
also to direct our behaviour towards certain outcomes. In real life, such prac-
tice would take the form of physically leading us towards certain aisles,
pushing us in certain directions or hiding products from our view. Similar
practices seem to be occurring in online business-to-consumer transactions.
It is one thing to state that ‘code regulates behaviour’ in an academic
article, it is yet another to see it in practice. The dangers of ‘regulating behav-
iour’ are, however, not universally recognised, particularly in the commercial
context. Arguably, many technologies may not have reached a level of effec-
tiveness, or intrusiveness, that translates into a direct manipulation of consu-
mer choices and warrants the attention of the popular press. Many of the
technological inﬂuences also seem too subtle to be caught by existing protec-
tions from unfair bargaining practices. Inﬂuences that do not involve overt
pressure or coercion fall into a large grey zone. Transactional exploitation
is, after all, not prohibited but only vaguely circumscribed by piecemeal sol-
utions in the form of vitiating factors. Artiﬁcially created bargaining advan-
tages seem objectionable but are not prohibited. It must not be forgotten,
however, that ‘we are only at the dawn of’ Big Data, predictive analytics,
178First Report on the application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market COM
(2013) 139 ﬁnal, 20.
179Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer
rights, art 9.
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recommender systems, behavioural advertising etc. Technological inﬂuences
will become stronger and more pervasive, especially in light of the introduc-
tion of the Internet-of-things. Interconnected fridges will not only collect data
about our eating habits but also order groceries on our behalf. Will such
fridges follow our shopping instructions or helpfully recommend ‘better’
consumption choices? Will they attempt to change our preferences by
pre-installed defaults?
We could endlessly debate whether courts should take the initiative to
review the narrow boundaries within which transactional exploitation can
be corrected by means of such doctrines as misrepresentation or undue inﬂu-
ence. Needless to say, such debate would be primarily of academic interest. As
indicated, courts are unlikely to perform ‘doctrinal jumps’ to address the risk
of technology-based transactional exploitation in online commerce. Existing
private law doctrines are complex, difﬁcult to enforce and leave gaps in pro-
tection. It seems pointless to ‘update’ contract law to grant individual relief if a
harmful commercial practice is prevalent and likely to affect most, if not all,
online consumers. We can tolerate some unfairness at an individual level,
especially if the online consumer fails to exercise basic diligence or otherwise
acts unreasonably in exercising his autonomy. We cannot, however, tolerate
unfairness at a systemic level – even if its manifestations are subtle to the
point of being ‘user-friendly’. It may take some time for consumers to
realise that online commerce does not offer more choices or better prices
and that the web is not an instrument of freedom or self-expression but,
increasingly, a giant opaque vending machine designed to exploit every
known or detectable cognitive bias. Unfortunately, it may also take more
time for online consumers to realise that services like search engines or
social networking platforms are provided by businesses, for commercial pur-
poses. As it is impossible to rely on consumer education or protection by
means of disclosure, the need for direct regulatory assistance seems indispu-
table. Apart from adjusting the UCPD, which seems remarkably future-proof
for a regulatory instrument drafted in 2005, a large part of the problem could
be addressed by implementing more restrictive privacy protections, thereby
putting an end to the commercial surveillance that fuels not only behavioural
advertising but most other technologies that inﬂuence transacting behaviour.
It must be realistically assumed, however, that drastic changes in the area of
privacy protection are improbable and that a sudden reversal of the trend to
collect and mine consumer information is unlikely.
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